Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research (2007)

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Chapter: 6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions

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Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

6
Recommendations for Future Research Directions

Progress has been made in the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) water security research program (see Chapter 4), but many important research questions and technical support needs remain. In Chapter 3, a framework is suggested for evaluating water security research initiatives that gives priority to research that improves response and recovery and/or develops risk reduction or consequence mitigation measures. The research should also produce tools with a reasonable likelihood of implementation and, where feasible, dual-use benefits. Based on this framework and the review of water security efforts already under way, two important water security research gaps are identified and discussed briefly in this chapter. In addition, short- and long-term water security research recommendations are made. The research recommendations are organized in this chapter according to the three long-term program objectives proposed in Chapter 5 emphasizing pre-incident, incident, and post-incident applications: (1) develop products to support more resilient design and operation of facilities and systems, (2) improve the ability of operators and responders to detect and assess incidents, and (3) improve response and recovery. Both drinking water and wastewater research priorities are addressed together within these three objectives to maximize research synergies that may exist.

KEY RESEARCH GAPS

The Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan (EPA, 2004a) set out a comprehensive guide for the EPA’s near-term research initiatives. Although the Action Plan was intended to provide a short-term (three- to four- year) research agenda, the previous National Research Council review (NRC, 2004) noted that several of the Action Plan projects represented long-term research questions not easily ad-

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

dressed in the original time frame. Therefore, the Action Plan provides a reasonable starting point for building the EPA’s future research program. Nevertheless, the short-term planning horizon of the Action Plan prevented consideration of two key subjects that are critical to a long-term water security research program: behavioral science and innovative system design. The committee recommends the EPA work in collaboration with other organizations to build research initiatives in these two areas.

Behavioral Science

The threat of bioterrorism presents new and different types of risks that are dynamic and pose difficult trade-offs, bringing about intellectual challenges and an emotional valence possibly more important than the risks themselves. Developing an effective communication strategy that meets the needs of the broad range of stakeholders (e.g., response organizations, water organizations and utilities, public health agencies, the public, the media) while addressing security concerns is clearly a high-priority research area. The EPA’s work on risk communication is focused primarily on the development of guidance, protocols, and training, and little emphasis has been devoted to interdisciplinary behavioral science research to better prepare stakeholders for water security incidents or to build confidence in their ability to respond. Behavioral science research could help address, for example, what the public’s beliefs, opinions, and knowledge about water security risks are; how risk perception and other psychological factors affect responses to water-related events; and how to communicate these risks with the public (Gray and Ropeik, 2002; Means, 2002; Roberson and Morely, 2005b). A better understanding of what short-term disruptions customers are prepared to tolerate may also guide response and recovery planning and the development of recovery technologies.

Previous experience with natural disasters and environmental risks provides a basis for investigating and predicting human behavior in risky situations (Fischoff, 2005). Existing models of human behavior during other kinds of crises, however, may not be adequate to forecast human behavior during bioterrorism or water security incidents (DiGiovanni et al., 2003).

Risk communicators consider empirical findings from psychology, cognitive science, communications, and other behavioral and social sciences to varying extents (Bostrom and Lofstedt, 2003). Although decision makers frequently predict panic and irrational behavior in times of

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

crisis, behavioral science researchers have found that people respond reasonably to such challenges (e.g., Fishoff, 2005). Given the urgency of terror risk communication, risk communicators are obliged to incorporate existing behavioral science research as it relates to water security risks.

The EPA should take advantage of existing behavioral science research that may be applicable to water security issues, but this requires knowledge and experience in behavioral science research. Where gaps exist, the EPA will need to engage in interdisciplinary, rigorous empirical research to obtain the necessary knowledge.

Innovative Designs for Secure and Resilient Water and Wastewater Systems

Innovative designs for water and wastewater infrastructure were not addressed in the EPA Action Plan, but the topic deserves a place in a long-term water security research program. The EPA’s research mission has traditionally included the development and testing of new concepts, technologies, and management structures for water and wastewater utilities to achieve practical objectives in public health, sustainability and cost-effectiveness. The addition of homeland security to its mission provides a unique opportunity to take a holistic view of current design and management of water and wastewater infrastructures. Innovation is needed to address the problem of aging infrastructures while making new water systems more resilient to natural hazards and malicious incidents. The EPA should, therefore, take a leadership role in providing guidance for the planning, design, and implementation of new, more sustainable and resilient water and wastewater facilities for the 21st century.

Disagreggation of large water and wastewater systems should be an overarching theme of innovation. Large and complex systems have developed in the United States following the pattern of urban and suburban sprawl. While there are clear economies of scale for large utilities in construction and system management, there are distinct disadvantages as well. The complexity of large systems makes security measures difficult to implement and complicates the response to an attack. For example, locating the source of incursion within the distribution system and isolating contaminated sections are more difficult in large and complex water systems. Long water residence times are also more likely to occur in large drinking water systems, and, as a result, disinfectant residual may be lacking in the extremities of the system because of the chemical and biological reactions that occur during transport. From a security perspec-

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

tive, inadequate disinfectant residual means less protection against intentional contamination by a microbial agent.

A breadth of possibilities exists for improving security through innovative infrastructure design. Satellite water treatment plants could boost water quality. Strategic placement of treatment devices (e.g., ultraviolet lamp arrays) within the distribution system could counter a bioterrorism attack. Wastewater treatment systems could be interconnected to provide more flexibility in case of attack, and diversion devices could be installed to isolate contaminants. Box 6-1 describes some of these concepts in greater detail, and specific research recommendations are suggested in the following section.

RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS: DEVELOP PRODUCTS TO SUPPORT MORE RESILIENT DESIGN AND OPERATION OF FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS

Specific research topics are suggested here in two areas to support development of more resilient water and wastewater systems: (1) innovative designs for water and wastewater and (2) improved methods for risk assessment, including processes for threat and consequence assessments.

Innovative Designs for Water and Wastewater Systems

Innovative changes to water infrastructure will require long-term investment in research. Existing systems have been in place for more than a century in older cities. Thus, bold new directions will understandably require intensive research at the outset to produce a defensible economic argument for change. On the other hand, the EPA has the opportunity to develop innovative approaches that can be implemented almost immediately in relatively new, as well as planned, urban and suburban areas. The first step in research would be to enumerate the opportunities for innovation, recognizing the constraints brought about by the size, age, and complexity of existing water and wastewater infrastructures. A broad-gauge, economic analysis should follow that would quantify the costs and multiple benefits of these innovative designs (e.g., increased security, improved drinking water quality, enhanced sustainability of water resources). In addition, there is an implicit need for EPA research-

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

BOX 6-1

Envisioning New Water and Wastewater Infrastructures

Three infrastructure concepts illustrate potential innovative approaches for improving the security and resilience of water and wastewater systems: (1) distribution and collection system interventions, (2) the use of distributed networks, and (3) the implementation of dual piping systems. Water distribution system interventions could include multiple points of treatment within the distribution system (e.g., UV disinfection, chemical addition) or effective inline monitoring and localized diversion, using multiple valves and interconnections for routing contaminated water out of the distribution system network. In wastewater collections systems, new designs might include realtime monitoring, interventions to isolate portions of the collection system should toxic or explosive constituents be detected (e.g., sensor-activated inflatable dams), and interconnections or online storage capacity for diversion, containment, and treatment.

The “distributed optimal technology network” (DOT-Net) concept (Weber, 2002; 2004) includes a holistic approach to decentralization of both water and wastewater treatment. The premise is that advanced water treatment would be installed most economically at the scale of households, apartment complexes, or neighborhoods using POU/POE technology. These devices offer protection against chemical and biological agents that escape conventional water treatment as well as agents that may be added to the distribution system subsequent to treatment. An almost infinite number of infrastructure variations involving water and wastewater are possible, even including the localized processing of wastewater for energy recovery.

An alternative concept of a dual water distribution system has been proposed to address water quality concerns in aging infrastructures while meeting demand for fire protection (Okun, 1997). Additional benefits could be gained by incorporating satellite and decentralized wastewater treatment facilities. In this concept, the existing water distribution system and storage tanks would be used for delivery of reclaimed water and for fire demand, and a new water distribution system would deliver potable water through much smaller diameter pipes (Snyder et al., 2002). The dual distribution system concept offers several security advantages. For example, fire protection would not depend upon the integrity of the potable water supply in the event of a terrorist attack. The installation of small diameter stainless steel pipes would reduce residence time in the system (and related water quality degradation) and also speed the recovery process from a chemical or biological attack. However, a dual distribution system might also make a contamination attack on the drinking water supply easier because less contaminant mass would be needed to produce a toxic effect.

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

ers to coordinate with the agency’s regulatory branch to validate the feasibility of the innovative concepts that are proposed.

Each of the infrastructure concepts illustrated in Box 6-1 require far more research to become feasible. The recommendations below outline specific research topics that, if addressed, could improve the safety and sustainability of water resources in the 21st century.

Disaggregation of Water and Wastewater Systems

The “distributed optimal technology network” (DOT-Net) concept (Norton and Weber, 2005; Weber, 2002; 2004) hinges upon the feasibility of distributed treatment via point-of-use (POU)/point-of-entry (POE) devices installed at the scale of individual buildings or perhaps small neighborhoods. The corollary premise is that installation of expensive advanced treatment technology at the centralized water treatment facility is unnecessary when only a fraction of the service area outside a “critical radius” requires additional protection. Only a broad economic analysis of this concept has been published thus far for a hypothetical urban center, but the assumptions need to be verified for actual systems, particularly because of the unique characteristics of individual cities. In addition, far more research is needed on the utility management required to ensure the reliability of POU/POE devices in widespread implementation.

Dual water systems have also been proposed to address aging infrastructure (see Box 6-1; Okun, 1997; 2005). As with the DOT-Net concept, long-term research is needed to determine the costs and benefits of constructing an entirely new paradigm for distribution system design. Research issues would include assessing the acceptability of reclaimed water for progressively more intense levels of nonpotable use (e.g., irrigation, toilet flushing, laundering), the acceptability and management demands of decentralized wastewater treatment facilities, and the net benefits to water security.

In-Pipe Interventions to Reduce Exposure

In-pipe engineering interventions (see Box 6-1) are deserving of research in a long-term water security research strategy. For example, research is needed to optimize the location of disinfection booster stations or to examine the effectiveness and feasibility of in situ ultraviolet (UV)

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

irradiation systems as a decontamination strategy. EPA research could also examine various pipe materials (e.g., stainless steel) and evaluate their benefits for security and sustainability relative to their costs.

Infrastructure Designs to Enable Isolation and Interconnection

Most large drinking water systems have the ability to isolate portions of their distribution systems during necessary system repairs, but security concerns provide a new impetus for rapid and effective isolation mechanisms. Research on innovative mechanisms to isolate or divert contaminated water in drinking water and wastewater systems would be useful. The EPA should identify these design options, research their costs and benefits (including dual-use benefits) and their feasibility both for existing systems and new infrastructure, and make this information available to system managers.

Improved Risk Assessments Procedures

A sound risk assessment process allows utilities to make better resource management decisions for enhancing their recovery capacity or security strategies to mitigate the consequences of an attack. The risk assessment process includes assessments of threat, consequences, and vulnerability. To date, most of the efforts to guide utilities in their own risk assessments have focused on vulnerabilities.

Threat Assessment

Water and wastewater utilities today are making resource management decisions related to security without adequate information about the nature and likelihood of threats to their systems. As discussed in Chapter 4, the EPA has focused their efforts on identifying contaminant threats without conducting similarly detailed analyses of possible physical and cyber threats. Both the nature and likelihood of these threats are needed for efficient allocation of resources at the utility level and within the EPA’s research program. Improved threat assessment would require the EPA and/or a consortium of water experts to work closely with the intelligence community and local law enforcement agencies. Other national and federal laboratory expertise within the Department of Energy,

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

Department of Defense, and private-public community might be needed as well. Threat assessments for water and wastewater should be periodically reviewed to identify threat scenarios that should be added to the list and to remove those that are no longer a concern. The development of a threat assessment process for local water and wastewater utilities with current techniques used in other infrastructures would also be helpful, provided the threat information could be communicated to those who need it (ASME, 2004; Sandia National Laboratories, 2001).

Consequence Assessment

A consequence assessment should accompany the threat assessment within the risk assessment process. Consequence assessments would provide decision makers with information on the potential for fatalities, public health impacts, economic impacts, property damage, systems disruption, effects on other infrastructures, and loss of public confidence. Procedures for determining the expected consequences from an attack or natural disaster are not currently being systematically developed. As a result, water system managers do not have sufficient data to make decisions about the benefits of risk reduction relative to the costs. The development and application of a consequence assessment procedure would provide decision makers with information needed to decide whether to mitigate the consequences, upgrade with countermeasures, take steps to improve response and recovery capacity, and/or decide to accept the level of risk and take no further action. A fault tree analysis that includes, for example, options for redundant systems or contingency water supplies could provide vital information on whether to invest in security upgrades or less costly consequence mitigation strategies. Many of these approaches have already been developed for other infrastructures (e.g., Risk Assessment Methodology [RAM]-T for the high-voltage power transmission industry or RAM-D for dams, locks, and levees; see Sandia National Laboratories, 2001; 2002). A thorough review of other RAM methodologies could provide guidance for consequence assessment strategies that could be incorporated into the Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-W).

The EPA has worked to develop the AT Planner tool to assist utilities in assessing the consequences from physical attacks (see Chapter 4). While AT Planner has been validated against actual blast test data for nonwater systems, there remains significant uncertainty in the applicability of the modeling for water security because it has not been validated

Suggested Citation:"6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions." National Research Council. 2007. Improving the Nation's Water Security: Opportunities for Research. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11872.

against the structures specific to those systems. Therefore, the ongoing evaluation of AT Planner by the EPA and select water utility operators should include an assessment of the applicability of AT Planner for each of the critical and high-consequence components of a water system. The EPA and water utilities should then consider whether any additional validation testing is needed to determine specific failure modes of relevant water system components (e.g., actual storage tanks, pumps, water conduits, chlorine tanks) and possible countermeasures.

Summary of Research Priorities for Secure and Resilient Systems

Short-Term Priorities
Long-Term Priorities